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ABSTRACT 
 
How does the country’s economic performance affect the EU Structural and Cohesion 
fund absorption rate? 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate if GDP per capita of each EU member state has a 
determinative influence on the country’s ability to use financial resources from the EU 
Structural funds. In order to scientifically analyze this relationship I  used descriptive 
methods for literature and empirical data study combined with a quantitative analysis in form 
of a fixed effects model. As a result of the study several observations occurred. First the EU 
fund absorption rate is significantly influenced by its economic performance and hence by its 
financial capacity. Second the absorption capacity has inherent complications and inherent 
problems e.g. measurement, monitoring and time discrepancies between countries. 
Based on the findings I recommend an extension of the conducted study which will involve 
statistics from current and future periods as well as additional key factors such as 
transparency, corruption. Thereupon a redefinition and precise execution and implementation 
of the EU financial instruments will be possible, which will increase funding efficiency and 
efficacy.  
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
By Polina Plamenova Petkova 
2012  
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
First of all I would like to thank Professor Younguck KANG for the supervision of this 
research projects, for his patience and great advisory. Additionally I would like to thank 
Professor Taejong KIM for being part of my research committee. Herewith I also would like 
to thank Anthony Gathogo for the moral and technical support through the realization of this 
project.   
iv 
Table of contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
I. Theoretical background of the European Regional policy .......................................................... 4 
II. The EU Regional Policy and Structural Funds: the New Way for Prosperity and Growth ......... 9 
III. EU Structural and Cohesion Funds Absorption Capacity ......................................................... 16 
IV. Fixed effect model-does GDP determine the absorption rate? .................................................. 23 
Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 34 
Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 36 
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... 37 
A. Appendix 1: Data set: GDP per Capita and EU Fund Absorption Rate for EU25 ................ 38 
B. Appendix 2: graph GDP per Capita of EU 25 ....................................................................... 39 
C. Appendix 3: graph EU Fund absorption rate in EU 25 ......................................................... 40 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 41 
 
 
 
  
1 
Introduction 
The EU is one of the strongest economies in the world with superior economic 
performance of 23% of world’s GDP1 (IMF, 2009) and the most advanced integration process 
of the 21st century. Today the EU has 27 members which share common economic and social 
policies, legal acts and supranational institutions. For example The European Council designs 
the Regional policy, which after approval from the European Parliament and European 
Commission, have to be implemented in each country. These policies are a result of big 
efforts to balance the development on the Old Continent, which the countries put since the 
1940’s of the last century. 
After The Second World War the leading European countries created the European 
communities and declared it to be the “first step in the federation of Europe"2.Since then the 
Communities began to grow and with the new member states new problems aroused. While 
many regions reported rapid growth other on the other hand faced economic decline and 
stagnation, which created interregional disparities and gaps between countries. Since 
development and improvement of the Communities wellbeing has been the main target of its 
members, a so called Regional policy has been created and developed through the years until 
today. Currently it has become the policy to which the EU dedicates more than 50% of its 
budget. The Regional policy is applied in each country and supported through the European 
Structural and Cohesion funds, which are the key financial instruments to achieve improved 
regional welfare. 
Although the Regional policy implementation provides visible socioeconomic 
benefits in form of transfers to poorer regions for all new members, for various reasons, it 
                                                          
1 GDP per capita in PPP 
2  "Declaration of 9 May 1950". European Commission. http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm Retrieved 5 
November 28, 2010. 
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still remains a topic of heavy debates in the academic as well as in the political arena. The 
effectiveness of the Structural and Cohesion fund are an object of extensive analysis and 
continue being discussed until today without having a clear answer whether they deliver the 
desired results or not.   
Since 2004 when ten (+2 in 2007) new countries from economically weaker CEE 
region entered the Union the terms of Absorption capacity and absorption rate have drawn the 
specialists attention. These two terms refer to the country’s ability to withdraw financial 
resources from the EU funds. In other words, the interest of authors has turned towards the 
final amount of money each country is able to inject to its economy. Low administrative 
capability to process projects was defined as a main reason and limit for high EU Fund 
absorption rate. Several Studies already analyze and discuss how to improve the 
administrative performance nevertheless no tangible results are available until now.  
The first available study on absorption capacity was conducted in 1998 by Holzman 
and Herve, who analyzed the structure and major factors that influence the processes within 
the EU funds. Later on in 2004 Horvath and Maier in their study “Absorption problems and 
the EU Structural Funds; Some aspects regarding administrative absorption capacity in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia” developed the concept into a 
more consistent framework and applied it reflecting problems that occurred in some CEE 
countries. Future authors refer to the later research results and relate the mentioned factors 
and issues to specific regional characteristics. Despite of that, none of the above mentioned 
authors used detailed quantitative models in order to generalize the existing trends and 
relationships. They searched for a solution from a microeconomic perspective how to raise 
the absorption rate without analyzing the possible macroeconomic forces influencing the 
absorption capacity of a country. 
Therefore I provide a basic general model on a possible determinative relationship 
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between a countries economic performance (GDP per capita) as an independent variable and 
its absorption rate as a dependent variable. A Fixed effects model will be applied to find out 
the influence of the macroeconomic variable on the cumulated performance measuring term 
of absorption rate. Should such determination become the result of this study numerous 
important conclusions about further steps in Fund proceeding and management can be made, 
based on expanded studies involving more sophisticated and detailed analysis.  
Generally speaking, if the country’s GDP determines the ability of a country to use 
resources from the EU Structural and Cohesion fund, the concept of the complete EU 
development policy may have to be revised. In case the model does not verify a strong 
relationship between the variables the studies of absorption improvement may have to be 
again concentrated on ex post management.  
In order to capture the role of the EU fund absorption rate I begin this paper with an 
overview of the theoretical basis and foundations of the European concept of regional 
development, which provides basic knowledge to understand the policy. In chapter two I 
provide a synopsis of the present EU as a sophisticated economic integration including its 
Regional policy and the concept of regional development. This is followed by a summary and 
discussion about the European Structural and Cohesion funds as financial instruments of the 
policy. Before delivering the quantitative analysis she extensively introduces the topic of EU 
fund absorption rate, including the drawback aspects and the inherent problems in the EU 
measurement concept. The mentioned model Fixed effects model will be presented in detail 
in the last chapter- chapter four. I analyze the relationship between GDP per capita and EU 
fund payment rate of 25 member states for the years of 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2011 using a 
STATA 10 Software. 
Finally after modeling the discussed relationship I conclude the main points and 
findings of this study. 
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I. Theoretical background of the European Regional policy 
 Before emphasizing the EU regional policy and its implementation instruments  it is 
necessary to clarify the origin of the European regional development concept. It evolved 
during the last 50years under the influence of multiple regional and growth theories. 
 The following figure visualizes the key stages for development of the Regional 
economics, which were driven by growing local and interregional problems mainly in Europe 
and the USA. 
 
Figure 1: Impulses for the development of Regional economics, Source: J. Macháček, 2009 
1850 -1920 
• Localization theories with stress on transportation cost 
• Laundhardt, Lardner, A. Weber 
• J. H. von  Thünen  
1930's and 
1940's  
• Localization theories with stress on  production factors and 
aglomeration effects 
• Definition of the role of trade cities as trade centers and the role of 
space as a production factor influencing the economical equilibrium 
• W. Christaller : Central place theory (1983) 
Plander, A. Lösch 
1950's  
• Polarization theories 
• Big areas with fundamental economical problems found as 
consequence of the 2WW 
• Rapid urbaniztion processes and overloading of developement regions, 
Innovation diffusion 
• F. Perrouux  Theory of growth poles 
1960's 
• Polariyation theories 
• Regional economics as a complex science  W. Isard 
• Input output models, A.O. Hirschman and Myrdals Theory of 
cumulative reasons 
1970's and 
1980's 
• Spatial Econometry and general economic models application in 
Regional economies 
• Urbanization crisis, Enviromental problems 
• Theories of endogenous developement , Romer, Lucas 
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 Although the European regional development concept is part of regional economics 
and studies, there are several important regional and growth models, which determined its 
current form since the 1950’s: neoclassical, Keynesian, neomarxistic, neoliberal and 
institutional approach. (Nedomlelová, 2008, )3.  
“Using a higher rate of abstractness it is possible to narrow the view onto two basic 
directions. The first comes out of the neoclassical and neoliberal paradigm. The regional 
approach highlights the natural convergence tendencies in the development of regions in the 
long run. The regional disparities are regarded as the result of natural development which 
arises from particularity of regions. Regional differences are understood as a possible impulse 
towards activation of “own (regional) forces”. This approach refuses the state interventions.” 
(Nedomlelová, 2008, p.4) The neoclassical approach helps us to understand the objectives of 
the EU regional policy and the origin of the idea to invest in human capital, business 
opportunities and environment protection as primer drives of sustainable development. 
“The second approach, the divergence theory, comes out of the Keynesian (post- and 
neokeynesian) and neomarxist economic theory. The substance of regional differences is in 
the market economy itself. According to this theoretical approach the market is not able to 
regulate itself. This leads to economic imbalance resulting in social sphere in the 
economically weak regions. The approach explains the necessity of state intervenes in 
economy.” (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.4,5). Herewith the strong EU interventions through 
regulations, standards, redistributive mechanisms and subsidies can be explained. 
“The oldest theories of regional development, better the forerunner, are localization 
                                                          
3 Due to volume limitations of this work the theories will be discussed partly with stress on neoclassical and Keynesian 
approaches. For a more detailed background of the European regional policies I refer to Nedomlelová, Iva. "Selected Models 
of Economic Growth versus the Theory of Regional Development." Technical University of Liberec, Ministry for Regional 
Development, (2008). 
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theories which belong to neoclassical theories of regional development. The theories appear 
in the 17
th
 and 18th century. The top of the oldest theoretical approaches is the study by J. H. 
von Thünen from 1826. The localization theories are the works by A. Weber, A. Marshall, W. 
Christaller (theory of central places) and A. Lősch. W. Isard, the founder of regional science, 
follows them.” (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.5) 
“In 1964 G. H. Borts a L. Stein tried to explain the regional economic growth using 
the one sector model of economic growth. The model develops the Cobb-Douglas production 
function which explains the relationship between the product and the capital stock, labor and 
technological progress.” (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.5) 
“After the conclusions of theoretical models and empirical studies did not match, the 
representatives of neoclassical approach deduced basic recommendation for regional 
economic policy. These recommendations were oriented on increasing the mobility of 
production factors, mainly the mobility of labor force. (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.6) 
Later on “in the 90s, P. Krugman, B. W. Arthur continued the growth accounting 
theory introduced by R. Sollow in the 50s of the twentieth century. R. Barro and X. Sla-i-
Martin continued with the new theory of growth.” (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.6)The last two 
authors have a key role in the future definition of neoliberal Theories of trade. 
“The theory of regional growth in the framework of the Keynesian approach 
developed in several directions.” (Nedomlelová, 2008, p.6) At the beginning F. Perroux 
defined his Theory of growth poles, based on the concept of determinative roles of growth, 
development and innovation poles. Additionally G. Myrdal created the Theory of cumulative 
reasons, where he assumes that some regions naturally have more rapid growth than others, 
based on cumulating cause effect processes. Myrdal’s model justifies government 
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interventions with the main objective of redistribution and consumption reallocation. 
(Nedomlelová, 2008). 
 In a whole the current European Regional development policy reflects characteristics 
from all mentioned theories. The most visible influence might be seen in the strong 
Keynesian interventionist state approach validating the developed systems of tax, subsidies 
and redistribution between regions. Additionally the key role of institutions in the EU growth 
concept has been proven by several theoretical and empirical studies where I refer to 
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés. "Do institutions matter for regional development in the EU?". 
 Having an overview of the theoretical background of EU regional development 
concept an important question arises: Is the theory reflected by reality? In particular it is 
important to find out the effect of such interventions on the national economies and the range 
of EU regional development policy implementation effectiveness. Although several authors 
question the real positive effect of EU Funding on economies and countries development and 
growth, results delivered by other studies proof the opposite: EU funding improves a 
countries economic performance. 
 Critics attack the fact, that rapid expand of a country’s government abilities to co-
finance projects and absorb Structural and Cohesion fund sources determines the successful 
realization of EU regional policy. Most of drawback countries recently entered the EU in 
2004 and 2007 face the problem of low capacity and disability to use “such large-scale 
transfers in a productive way” (Reszkető, 2010). G.Georgescu (2008) gives a more detailed 
explanation about a paradox situation when the mentioned disadvantaged regions, with the 
largest need for transfers, report the lowest absorption rates. It is a result of low 
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administrative capacity, only. Hence the low EU fund absorption rate4 causes regional policy 
failure.  
 Herve and Holzmann (1997) as well as the EU consultants and experts raise questions 
if the Socioeconomic cohesion between regions takes place at all. They attack the weak 
points of EU regional policy (e.d. complexity and high level of abstract in RP nature) and its 
implementation. The term of “absorption rate” has many limitations too, which will be 
discussed in the next chapters., Equally important is the issue of evaluation has to be 
mentioned which can be delivered ex-post only for the reason of the differences in 
international timing in measurements of performance and difficulties caused by the n+3 rule. 
Even though the questions about the above mentioned issues are important when judging the 
efficacy of EU regional policy, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the influence of the 
complex Cohesion policy on country’s development, but the overall impact of EU funds as 
financial instruments and transfer mechanisms. 
 In order to justify the efficacy of EU transfers I present evidence about a study based 
on an I-O model (Petkova, 2010). Its outcome proofs the negative influence of a low EU fund 
absorption rate and government expenditures on a countries’ output, so that we can explain 
the significant role of the EU financial instruments in the process of stimulating economic 
growth of regions with low performance. On the example of Bulgaria P.Petkova shows that 
low absorption rate prevents Bulgaria to grow and generate maximized output. Only 20% of 
possible increases in industries performance can be reached if only 26% of EU fund resources 
are injected into the economy (Petkova, 2010). To sum up, the model visualizes that 
redistribution processes in form of governmental support and spending injected into a 
countries economy stimulate the growth of particular industries (Petkova, 2010).  
                                                          
4 Absorption rate: the term will be defined in the following chapter 
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II. The EU Regional Policy and Structural Funds: the New Way for Prosperity and 
Growth 
Over 500Million5 (EUROSTAT, 2010) live in the 97 divergent NUTS I regions6, 
which have differences in performance, conditions, advantages and disadvantages. In order to 
lessen the gap between the countries, close cooperation is required, so that the Union, in 
reality, becomes an area of freedom, security and justice with the strongest economical force 
in the world. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to realize its target the EU 
defined several policies and instruments to implement it. One is the European regional 
development policy, with the main objective of lessening the substantial economical 
disparities among regions, which in its biggest extreme vary from 26% of the EU277 GDP 
average in the region of Severozapaden in Bulgaria (Eurostat, 2010), to 334% of the average 
in Inner London in the United Kingdom (Eurostat, 2010) . In addition, the EU created the 
Structural and Cohesion funds to support the underdeveloped regions. These funds are the 
key financial instruments to reduce regional disparities in terms of income, wealth and 
opportunities. 
The accumulation of economies and the observing of basic rules and principles 
defined in the Lisbon treaty and its antecessor treaties determine the success in the 
development of the regions separately and of the EU as a whole. One of the basic key 
principle is for instance the principle of solidarity among member states determines the 
                                                          
5 501,1 Million in January 2010 (EUROSTAT,2010) 
6 NUTS I: major socio-economic regions within 1 country. The current NUTS classification valid from 1 January 2008 until 
31 December 2011 lists 97 regions at NUTS 1, 271 regions at NUTS 2 and 1303 regions at NUTS 3 level. Regions in the 
context of EU are defined as NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). For more detailed information 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_GLOSSARY_NOM_DTL_VIEW&StrNom=
CODED2&StrLanguageCode=EN&IntKey=16527185&RdoSearch=CONTAIN&TxtSearch=NUTS&CboTheme=&IntCurr
entPage=1 
7 EU27- EU with 27 members   
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distribution of income between prosperity and poor regions, which is one of the tools of 
achieving social and economic cohesion between them. 
 Beyond those basic principles the EU stimulates its member’s development 
through supranational policies and financial instruments for their implementation. One of the 
most important policies is the Regional development and cohesion policy, which encourages 
the weak member’s growth through support from the Structural and Cohesion funds and 
national budgets. 
“Since the Rome Treaty of 1957, one of the main tasks of the Community has been 
to promote a harmonious development of economic activities” (Petzold, 2008) through the 
Regional policy. In 1975 the first financial instrument ERDF8 was established with the key 
objective of supporting underdeveloped regions. Later on as the EU grew, new difficulties 
arose and solutions were required. Economies started changing their structures, inter and 
intraregional development differences began to grow and grew faster than expected. Some 
regions experienced economic and social development boost such as in Northern Italy, 
Western Germany, others began to stagnate such as industrial areas in the so called 
BENELUX9 countries or regions Southern Italy.  
Therefore the ESF10 and Cohesion fund11 were formed as financial instruments to 
support the Regional policy implementation. After they went through several regulatory, 
functional and organizational changes in the 80’s and 90’s, the European Structural funds 
                                                          
8 ERDF: “European Regional Development Fund, is currently the largest. Since 1975 it has provided support for the creation 
of infrastructure and productive job-creating investment, mainly for businesses” (European Union, 2010) 
9 BENELUX: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg 
10 ESF: “European Social Fund set up in 1958, contributes to the integration into working life of the unemployed and 
disadvantaged sections of the population, mainly by funding training measures. Although its primary function was to 
upgrade human resources capital and later in the 80”s became a Structural fund.” (European Union,2010) 
11In order to speed up economic, social and territorial convergence, the European Union set up a Cohesion Fund in 1994. 
“The purpose of the Cohesion Fund is to grant financing to environment and transport infrastructure projects. “(European 
Union, 2010) 
11 
became the key financial instruments to implement the Cohesion policy until the final 
changes in 200412 defined the current policy and its instruments. For the present planning 
period of 2007-2013 the Structural and Cohesion funds deliver resources to boost the 
economic, social and territorial cohesion between developed and lagging regions using three 
guiding objectives : 1. Convergence; 2. Regional competitiveness and employment; 3. 
European territorial cooperation.  
In overall the EU is financing projects and activities, which will increase the 
convergence between regions, increase the local competitiveness through enabling it’s 
potential and initiate building strong across country cooperation in various arias such as 
social activities, business and science. 
In order to be able to financially enhance the mentioned activities a large 
supranational budget is required. In the same way the EU regional policy was defined and 
adopted for the period of 2007-2013, the EU budget was approved in the amount of  €862 
Billion (European Union, 2007) 13  with the purpose of “improving the life of  the EU's 
citizens and communities”(European Union, 2010).  
On one side expenditures for the present period will be realized in the area of 
sustainable growth and cohesion for growth and employment, where the biggest investments 
are represented by the Cohesion policy (SF and CF) (European Union, 2006). On the other 
side these will be financed through income14 from national contributions (79%), TOR 15(14%), 
                                                          
12 In 2004 fundamental regulations were made in order to adjust the policy and its instruments to the widely divergent EU 
territory, which was caused by the entry of 10 additional member countries. In 2006 further changes were defined to adopt 
the policy for the needs accruing after the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
13 In 2007 the EU defined the budget with expenditures over €975 Billion (in current prices) for a sever year period, or in 
other words 1.5% of EU GNI.(European Union, 2007) 
14  For detailed information find under http://ec.europa.eu/budget/anim/where_did_eu_funds_come_from/2007-
2013/index_en.htm  
15 Traditional Own Resources such as agricultural duties, sugar levies and customs duties (European commission, 2010) 
more under http://ec.europa.eu/budget/anim/where_did_eu_funds_come_from/2007-2013/index_en.htm .  
12 
surplus from previous year (1,6%) ,surplus from external aid guarantee fund (0.7%) and other 
resources (4.6%) (European commission, 2010). It is important to mention that the exact  
annual amount dedicated to the specific financed areas (agriculture, Cohesion policy, rural 
development etc.) are approved each year by the EC and EP and so vary from the previous 
one (European Council, 2005).  Annually this amount is modified by the European 
Commission, which has to reflect the needs of each country for the next years, based on the 
results from the previous period.  
Basically the EU budget can be better characterized as a financial framework or 
limit up to which the EU can use within a certain period of time e.g. 2007-2013. Additionally 
each country has a limit based on its ability to withdraw money and on its need for 
investment support. Basically the EU budget can be better characterized as a financial 
framework or limit up to which the EU can use within a certain period of time e.g. 2007-2013. 
Within the EU limit each country has an individual limit based on its ability to withdraw 
money and on its need for investment support. Country limits are usually fixed and are not 
extended after reaching a limit. In case a limit was not reached, the money left from the 
current year can be used in the following year. This time based transfer is limited by planning 
periods of the EU.16 “The EU budget never runs a deficit, never builds up debt and only 
spends what it receives. It is always balanced “(EC, 2011). 
Briefly, the EU budget is a multiyear budget or a maximal possible amount of 
resources, which can be used within the EU policies. These also reflect the current 
importance and needs within the Union’s policies by being adjusted according to the actual 
economic development of each member state. 
                                                          
16 Support in form of International grants and packages which for example were provided to Greece as an action to prevent 
state bankruptcy are not counted into the EU budget. 
13 
 In general, the overarching priorities for the Structural funds are determined at the EU 
level and then transformed into national priorities by the member states and regions. “At the 
supranational level the overarching priorities are established in the Community Strategic 
Guidelines (CSG). These set the framework for all actions that can be taken using the funds 
including the total financial framework for each country to spend on the particular objectives. 
Within this framework, every member state develops its own National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF)”(European Parliament, 2009,25). The NSRF sets out the priorities for the 
respective member state, taking specific national policies into account (European Parliament, 
2009, 25). Finally, Operational Programmes17 for the separate region within the member state 
are drawn up in accordance with the respective NSRF, reflecting the needs of each individual 
region. Following this process a total amount of €382.1 billion (EC, 2010) was allocated for 
the Cohesion policy. In particular 81.7% will be spent on the Convergence objective, 15.8% 
on Regional competitiveness and employment objective and 2.4% on Territorial co-operation 
objective (European Union, 2007).  
 In order to understand how the transaction system between the EU level and the 
national level take place this paper has to provide an explanation of the “withdrawal” rules 
and principles. In other words “regions eligible for funding from the SF18 are those, whose 
GDP per capita in the period 2000-2002 is less than 75% of the EU 25 average (European 
council, 2005). Among other regions all the territory of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and part of 
                                                          
17 “The Structural funds only supplement national or regional financing. This means that no programmes are ever totally 
covered by the European budget, and that there is always national co-financing from either the public or the private sector.” 
(Daman, 2001) 
“Financing of the programmes is based on a system of budgetary commitments and payments. The commitments actually 
represent a “financial contract” between the Commission and the Member State, for the allocation of European funds to the 
programmes. At this stage, there is therefore no “physical movement” of funds. The commitments are paid in annual 
installments, and the first installment is made when the Commission approves the assistance.” European Union, 2007).  
Subsequent installments are committed, at the latest, on 30 April of each year.”(Daman, 2001) 
18 ERDF and ESF 
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the territory in Germany (east), France, and United Kingdom (European Union, 2006) are 
eligible for funding through ERDF and ESF. Likewise only member states with GNI per 
capita in the period 2001-2003 less than 90% of the EU 25 average are eligible for funding 
through the Cohesion fund (European council, 2005). Again the whole territory of Bulgaria 
and Romania including other regions fulfill this criterion.  
 In the same way as GDP criterion determines funding authorization, a second criterion 
plays a key role while applying for support from the Funds. Each of them co finances projects 
in specific areas. The ERDF, for example, provides sources for projects improving investment 
productivity, infrastructure and SME19 development. ESF is designed to help employment 
promotion and human resources quality increase. Finally, the CF is the fund, through which 
projects for better infrastructure and environment with high investment costs are financed 
(European Union, 2010). Hence the total “mix” of areas the EU SF and CF support reflect the 
key factors for economic growth and welfare, business environment, human resources and 
infrastructure.  
 The way the EU supports weak socioeconomic regions can be defined as an 
international redistribution in form of transfers. Each country is duty-bound to contribute to 
the EU budget annually up to 1.24% of total GNI and can receive up to 4% of its GDP 
(Zeman, 2009) without the obligation of paying any interest. The financial support from the 
EU is a form of subsidy or grant per project to the countries, which have to co-financing 
responsibility.  
Having an overview of the theoretical background of EU regional development 
concept an important question arises: Is the theory reflected by reality? In particular it is 
important to find out the effect of such interventions on the national economies and the range 
of EU regional development policy implementation effectiveness. Although several authors 
                                                          
19 SME: Small and Middle sized Enterprises  
15 
question the real positive effect of EU Funding on economies and countries development and 
growth, results delivered by other studies proof the opposite: EU funding improves a 
countries economic performance. 
 Critics attack the fact, that rapid expand of a country’s government abilities to co-
finance projects and absorb Structural and Cohesion fund sources determines the successful 
realization of EU regional policy. Most of drawback countries recently entered the EU in 
2004 and 2007 face the problem of low capacity and disability to use “such large-scale 
transfers in a productive way” (Reszkető, 2010). G.Georgescu (2008) gives a more detailed 
explanation about a paradox situation when the mentioned disadvantaged regions, with the 
largest need for transfers, report the lowest absorption rates. It is a result of low 
administrative capacity, only. Hence the low EU fund absorption rate
20
 causes regional policy 
failure.  
 Herve and Holzmann (1997) as well as the EU consultants and experts raise questions 
if the Socioeconomic cohesion between regions takes place at all. They attack the weak 
points of EU regional policy (e.g. complexity and high level of abstract in RP nature) and its 
implementation. The term of “absorption rate” has many limitations too, which will be 
discussed in the next chapters., Equally important is the issue of evaluation has to be 
mentioned which can be delivered ex-post only for the reason of the differences in 
international timing in measurements of performance and difficulties caused by the n+3 rule. 
Even though the questions about the above mentioned issues are important when judging the 
efficacy of EU regional policy, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the influence of the 
complex Cohesion policy on country’s development, but the overall impact of EU funds as 
financial instruments and transfer mechanisms. 
 In order to justify the efficacy of EU transfers I present evidence about a study based 
                                                          
20 Absorption rate: the term will be defined in the following chapter 
16 
on an I-O model (Petkova, 2010). Its outcome proofs the negative influence of a low EU fund 
absorption rate and government expenditures on a countries’ output, so that we can explain 
the significant role of the EU financial instruments in the process of stimulating economic 
growth of regions with low performance. On the example of Bulgaria P.Petkova shows that 
low absorption rate prevents Bulgaria to grow and generate maximized output. Only 20% of 
possible increases in industries performance can be reached if only 26% of EU fund resources 
are injected into the economy (Petkova, 2010). To sum up, the model visualizes that 
redistribution processes in form of governmental support and spending injected into a 
countries economy stimulate the growth of particular industries (Petkova, 2010).  
III. EU Structural and Cohesion Funds Absorption Capacity 
 “An introspection of the literature regarding the absorption of EU 
structural funds reveals a lack of adequate conceptual framework while the 
topic of better ways to manage these funds is less addressed. As the 
explanation could not be related to the lack of interest in studying such a 
problem, the reasons are essentially linked to its relative novelty, to the 
difficulties in assessing the impact of structural funds on the convergence of 
EU countries in the long term, to construction of appropriate indicators, 
including for the measurement of the absorption capacity.”(Georgescu, 
2008). 
 In general the absorption capacity, most often, is understood as the extent to which a 
member state including all involved shareholders is able to spend financial resources 
allocated from the structural funds with the goal of increasing socioeconomic development. 
Thereupon absorption rate is the actual amount of resources being spent out of the assigned 
total available sum. (European Committee, 2008) 
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 The Commission formed this term as an indicator to measure effective and efficient 
usage of external investment support. In other words absorption capacity (rate) reflects the 
amount of resources a country has spent out of the maximum (4% of the national GDP) 
allocated for the respective country. (Wostner, 2008) For instance the absorption rate of the 
EU 27 on 30 September 2009 averages on 27% (Eurocativ, 2010), which means that the 
eligible EU members allocated only 27% of the available funds. Generally speaking the term 
absorption rate serves as a comparable single number indicator for measuring and evaluating 
countries performance in allocating resources from the EU Structural and Cohesion funds. 
 Besides the absolute amount of Funds spend, the absorption capacity as a concept 
contains qualitative variables, which have explanatory power about main forces and factors 
influencing the countries successful allocation of transfers. In fact “absorption capacity in its 
turn can be determined by three main factors, namely macro-economic situation, the co-
financing situation and the administrative capacity: 
 Macroeconomic absorption capacity can be defined and measured in terms of 
GDP;(Boeckhout et al., 2002) 오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. 
 Financial absorption capacity can be defined as the ability to co-finance EU 
supported programmes and projects, to plan and guarantee these national 
contributions in multi-annual budgets, and to collect these contributions from 
several partners interested in a programme or project;(Boeckhout et al., 2002)  
 Administrative capacity can be defined as the ability and skill of central and local 
authorities to prepare suitable plans, programmes and projects in due time, to 
decide on programmes and projects, to arrange the co-ordination among 
principal partners, to cope with the administrative and reporting requirements, 
and to finance and supervise implementation properly, avoiding irregularities as 
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far as possible.” (Boeckhout et al., 2002)  
 Taking into account the above stated definition in general the specialists and analysts 
believe that the administrative capacity has the strongest and most powerful influence on a 
countries overall absorption rate and ability to use international support. Besides the 
empirical evidence several reasons give explanation for that. 
 There is a consensus that the problems of absorption capacity depend heavily on 
institutional factors. The process of EU funding is a very complicated and administratively 
extremely challenging, especially for disadvantaged regions that need the largest support. 
Paradoxally, these regions face the biggest difficulties in the absorption of the Funds because 
of administrative capacity shortage. (Zaman, Georgescu, 2008)Mainly small municipalities 
with lack of qualified staff and know how fail in the highly complex processing of project 
admissions. 
 In addition other problems referring to programming, to institutional building and to 
administrative capacity development, slow down the procedures. Operational programs 
designed on national and regional level and local strategies often are not harmonized and 
contain incompatible goals. Bulgaria as an example of contradicting document often faces the 
problem of incompatibility of ecological projects for conservation of National parks and 
targets of increasing tourism activities in remote areas, which often include the protected 
National parks. 
 Finally, the issue of low financial capacity is a constraint to absorb and receive 
financial resources from the Structural and Cohesion funds. At this point it is possible to 
understand the draw backs of the additionality principles, which the EU regional policy is 
based on. 
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 The EU provides funding in the amount of up to 90%
21
 of the total project cost. The 
limitation here is the low national budgets, which in fact are the barrier to use the Fund 
resources. The size of these budgets depends, besides on other input items, mainly on income 
tax collected, which is also strongly related to the country’s GDP.  In simple terms, for the 
reason that countries have limited resources they cannot co-finance their development 
projects, even in the cases when they have to provide the minimum amount
22
 for the 
realization. However in reality applicants have to supply nearly 100% of the cost, which the 
EU returns after a project has reached a certain stage. As a consequence the number of 
financially capable applicants decreases drastically, together with the overall absorption rate. 
 At this point it is necessary to mention the role of national and international financial 
institutions- banks. They have indirect influence of countries success in the process of 
absorption of EU funds. They have indirect influence of countries success in the process of 
absorption of EU funds. First they have a crucial impact as many applicants refer to loans 
which are used as so called own resources when applying for grants. Should banks have a 
restrictive policy and limit lending provision to only strong firms, as a result SMEs, 
especially those in the agriculture sector are strongly disadvantaged and disabled to access 
EU money. Second the heights of the interest rates23 of those banks play a similar role. High 
interest rates on lending for financing regional policy projects also build a barrier for 
realization. Therefore the EU has established a solution of such problems in 1958. In other 
words the EU investment bank “raises considerable sums of money on the capital markets for 
                                                          
21 The range of support differs from project to project and depending under which objective the project will be categorized 
22 10% of total project cost. 
23 National central banks are not supposed to influence interest rates in order to respect EU regional policies, as it may have a 
significant effect on the whole economy including unexpected side effects. Additionally such intervention favoring only one 
supranational defined policy may put other policies in a disadvantaged position. With this object Central banks are also 
supposed to keep their neutrality to state and Union policies and keep their decision independence including abstraction of 
external influences/ 
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the purpose of lending it to the Member States24.” (European committee, 2008)  
 Financial institutions seem to be important actors in the process of accessing EU 
funds as well as other institutions and players. The following chapter will illustrate their roles, 
with the intention to clarify each single shareholder’s influence on a countries EU fund 
absorption rate. 
 Many actors build a complex shareholder group that in each country strongly 
influences the absorption rate of EU funds. They affect the process depending from the range 
of their responsibilities. For instance from the supranational perspective EU commission, EU 
auditors and other countries municipalities and organizations influence each countries 
performance in absorbing EU resources. The Regional and Cohesion policy defined for the 
whole Union as a union directly affects every single member, as it has to be included in 
national plans and as well implemented and monitored. When a country such as Bulgaria or 
Romania is obligated to include regional development aspects, which are absolutely new 
policy area, they need a certain period of time to gain experience, which automatically leads 
to lower absorption rate 25 . Other countries municipalities influence each other through 
benchmarking in local strategy development, project realization and knowledge sharing, 
which positively influences their success rate. 
 In the same way the Fund absorption level is affected by shareholders active in the 
national economy. NGOs, municipalities, private and public actors bear the responsibility for 
project planning and implementation. To explain the private actors, NGOs and municipalities 
plan and realize projects. Besides them the governmental institutions form legal and 
beaurocratic framework in order to create a clear implementation and monitoring project flow. 
                                                          
24 “Priority is given to projects for developing less-developed regions. “(European committee, 2008) 
25 Due to higher failure rate based on lack of know- how and routine 
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In case all steps are well planned and put into action each of those shareholders will 
positively contribute for the whole regions development through EU Structural and Cohesion 
fund.  
 While this is true in the theoretical and highly optimistic level, in reality nearly all 
shareholders are a bigger burden for the applicants then their tool to success. National 
institutions responsible for operational programs, define controversial frameworks and legal 
acts, which confuse and disable applicants in their actions. Municipalities, due to lack of 
independence or financial abilities concentrate more on daily activities then on strategic 
planning, which results in miserable project coordination and support. Generally speaking the 
shareholders- policy makers, third parties and applicants are those who have the 
responsibility to improve their performance so that the visions and strategies on the EU level 
are productively realized. 
 Absorption capacity, as defined in the previous chapters is a revolutionary measuring 
variable, which enables relatively comparable evaluation of countries performance in dealing 
with Structural and Cohesion funds. Although the single number provides understandable and 
clear information about the complex process of receiving and allocating external financial aid, 
the absorption capacity as it is constructed now has several limitations and is strongly 
criticized. Even though the EU funds absorption capacity is still used as an overall evaluation 
factor and for that reason it has to be studied in order to correct drawbacks and to minimize 
disadvantages. 
 The biggest problem related to the absorption capacity is the so called n+2 and n+3 
rule, which refers to the budgetary commitments relating to the OP and each objective (see 
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chapter Strategic and Cohesion funds)
26
. Generally speaking countries can use the resources 
from funds for a certain planning period 2 respectively 3 years after the new period started. 
Consequently it means that the overall absorption capacity can be evaluated ex post only, 
especially the aspects of the financial capacity (Horvat, Maier,2004). In practice these results 
in the fact, that new member states
27
 can be evaluated only due to the usage of pre-accession 
funds, which have different conditions than the Structural and Cohesion funds. On top of that 
the Regional Policies and the EU strategies constantly change, including priorities and 
objectives. For these reasons at the end effect, new members’ absorption rate cannot be 
directly compared with the rate of old member states and between the planning periods 
themselves.  
 In addition to that a problem arises from the fact that the EU has not defined rules for 
reporting the annual absorption rate and its measurement. Each country still has the freedom 
to declare how much they have used from a different perspective. Therefore” it is more 
relevant and reliable to compare the progress of individual Member States with the EU 
average. Caution should be exercised when making direct comparisons between Member 
States as although the Commission requested data corresponding to how the situation stood 
on 30 September 2009, some Member States chose to send data extracted on other dates. 
Differences of several months could influence the volume of allocations made to a particular 
                                                          
26 “The Commission commits the first annual proportion before the adoption of the operational programme. Afterwards, it 
commits the proportions by 30 April of each year, at the latest. Automatic decommitment: A portion of the budgetary 
commitment is automatically decommitted by the Commission if it has not been used or if no payment application has been 
received by the end of the second year following that of the budgetary commitment (n+2)more information available in 
Articles 31§2 and 32§2of Council regulation (EC)No.1260/1999 of June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural funds 
For Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia and Slovakia, the deadline is set for the end of the third year (n+3) between 2007 and 2010, under their operational 
programmes.” (EU,2010) 
27 12 countries which entered the EU in 2004(Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia) and 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania), which represents 44% of total members (EC, 2010) 
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sector.  Concepts and practices of project selection also vary between Member States, with 
particular regional and national procedures playing an important role in selection.”(EC, 2010)  
 Another crucial problem arises when judging the AC between countries through the 
years. Besides that measurement and time framework are not standardized, the EU has not yet 
defined a monitoring rule according to which the statistical data about the fund 
implementation screening. The consequence of this is that in each country a different 
statistics can be created. In some these are made by the statistical offices (Czech Republic) in 
other by for the EU funding the responsible ministry (Bulgaria) or agency or by the regions 
themselves.  
IV. Fixed effect model-does GDP determine the absorption rate? 
 When analyzing the issue of correlation between the EU fund absorption rate and 
economic performance I considered applying regressive analysis. When taking in account the 
characteristics of the variables a fixed effects model with a dummy variable was chosen. The 
reason is that a “simple regression equation likely suffers from omitted variable 
problems.”(Wooldridge, 2006) By obtaining multiple observations about each country and 
looking at the effect of GDP within each EU member across time, we have removed the effect 
of omitted variable bias.  
There are factors and predictors that influence the absorption capacity and are 
difficult to observe or quantify. In each country these factors may vary significantly. “One of 
the best available methodologies is to use fixed effect model for the analysis. It makes 
possible to analyze units over time, thus providing multiple observations on each individual 
sample.”(Hsiao, 1989). As Hsiao mentions it is the more suitable method to analyze variables 
changing in time than using “conventional multi sectional  or time series data sets to 
overcome missing or unobserved variables” ( Akin, 2005). For that reason the unobserved 
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factors affecting the dependent variable (absorption capacity) in the panel data will be viewed 
as of “consisting of two types: those that are constant and those that vary over time.” 
(Wooldridge, 2006).   
 A fixed effect model will examine the interdependency between two variables: 
economic performance as a dependent and absorption rate as independent variable so that the 
reverse relationship between these variables can be explained. Studies report positive 
influence on a countries’ economic performance achieved through implementation of EU 
regional policy and financing of development projects with resources from the EU Structural 
and Cohesion fund. Several regional theories emphasize on multiplying effect of investment 
on GDP. Here I will test if the multiplying effect creates a closed cycle. In other words, I will 
prove if the process is completed by a determinative relationship between GDP and 
absorption rate? 
 
Figure 2: Direction of determinative relationship, Source: author 
  
 In the first place the data set has to be defined. EUROSTAT, the official EU statistics 
agency delivers all needed data about GDP of all 27 European Union members28. According 
                                                          
28 GDP per capita in Euro for the years of 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2011, when the latest data are based on estimations. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes  
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to the EU regulations each member is obligated to report statistics it’s about socioeconomic 
performance following the standardized procedures, measurement methods and time periods. 
Nevertheless due to the limitations and the problems inherent in the absorption rate, the 
variable of “absorption rate” is not easily estimable, which limits the range of the model. 
Therefore data for only four periods were available.  
Additionally, it is necessary to mention, that this study will examine only 25 EU 
members. The reason is that the newest members: Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU in 
2007 first. Before the entry they received benefits from the Pre accession funds. As the 
mechanism and structure of the pre-accession funds differ from the Structural funds these two 
variables are not comparable. Hence, Bulgaria and Romania will be excluded from the study 
in order to remain its consistency.  
Namely the sample for the applied fixed effect model covers 25 European Union 
member countries over the period of 2004-2011. A Period of four years was selected, where 
the data were available for all countries, in order to create a balanced panel. The figures for 
national GDP per capita29 were obtained from EUROSTAT, whereas the latest numbers for 
the year of 2011 are based on estimations, because they are not available yet for all countries.  
The data about EU fund absorption rate were retrieved from several EU Institutions such as 
the European Commission and Court of auditors30.  The absorption capacity retrieved from 
the mentioned sources therefore is a percentage of all allocated resources which were in fact 
spent in the economy of each country.  
After the data set is explained it is important to look back to the process of how the 
                                                          
29 GDP per capita in EURO in current prices retrieved 21.02.2012 from  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c&lang=en 
30 Absorption capacity retrieved from the latest AC report and the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20 the and 21st ANNUAL REPORTS ON 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS issued by the European Commission, retrieved 21.02.2012 from 
www.ec.europa.eu  
26 
model was selected Several models were taken in consideration: simple regression, fixed or 
random effect model or Hausman specification test. All analyses were tested and after a 
theoretical and empirical proof was delivered, I chose the Fixed effect model.  
Firstly regression and the Hausman test were taken in consideration. “The Hausman 
specification test is a very general test and can be used if two models could be used for the 
same question. In our example we have the fixed and the random effects model. Both models 
will be consistent estimator but we assume that the random effects estimator is more efficient  
e.g. uses less degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis tells us pretty much the same while the 
alternative is that only the fixed effect model is consistent. If we reject the Null we cannot use 
the random effects model.” (Parlow, 2010) According to Baum31 (2006) the problematic side 
of the  Hausman  test is that it tends to reject the random effects model very often and does 
not provide reliable results if the data sample is very small.  
Secondly the Random and Fixed effect were evaluated.  “Random effects assume that 
the entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors which allows for time-invariant 
variables to play a role as explanatory variables. In random effects models you need to 
specify those individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables. 
The problem with this is that some variables may not be available therefore leading to 
omitted variable bias in the model. RE allows generalizing the inferences beyond the sample 
used in the model.” (Torres-Reyna, 2011) 
“The fixed effect model assumes that individual country heterogeneity is captured by 
the intercept term. This means every country gets its own intercept µi while the slope 
coefficients are the same. The fixed effect model is also known as least square dummy 
variable estimator (LSDV) because we assign pretty much a dummy to every 
                                                          
31 Chapter 8 in Baum, Christopher F. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. Texas: Stata Press, 2006.  
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country.”(Parlow, 2010) 
Therefore after evaluating the advantages and weaknesses of each model, the Fixed effect 
model was chosen as the most suitable one. Nevertheless assumptions needed to me made in 
order to be able to minimize the influence of the inherent drawbacks of the absorption 
capacity. In particular their function is to limit the errors in the model. The following study 
will be based on several assumptions, which is necessary in order to limit the errors in the 
model. These are:  
 Equal distribution of EU fund resources through the years (strongest 
assumption). The exact number in case of absorption rate unavailability will be 
calculated in two possible ways. First, the paid out funds/ number of years of 
the respective planning period will be weighted to the number of projects 
supported. Second, a wages average of absorption rates available for each 
objective in case at least 60% of all eligible programs for the country deliver a 
monitored absorption rate statistics will represent the overall countries’ 
absorption rate.  
 Simultaneous rate measurement and rate report between countries  
 Corruption level, Administrative capacity and Project distribution between 
private and public subjects has no influence on the variables. 
 
After discussing the basic starting points of the study it is now time to move on to the casual 
analysis. The analysis using the fixed effect model will be based on the following equation:  
 
Respectively  
AbCapit = β1GDPCAPit + αi + uit 
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Where: 
 αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each entity (n entity-specific interce
pts); 
 AbCapit is the dependent variable (DV) where i = entity and t = time. i.e. Ab
sorption capacity; 
 GDPCAPit represents one independent variable (IV) in this case GDP per Ca
pita; 
 β1 is the coefficient for GDP per Cap; 
 uit is the error term.32 
“The key insight is that if the unobserved variable does not change over time, then 
any changes in the dependent variable must be due to influences other than these fixed 
characteristics ” (Stok and Watson, 2003, p.289-290). “Fixed-effects will not work well with 
data for which within-cluster variation is minimal or for slow changing variables over time.” 
(Torres-Reyna, 2011) 
Absorption Rate Fixed effect Random effect Hausman 
GDPCAP -0.00314
* 
(B) 0.000550
**
  
 (-2.50) (2.62)  
    
Intercept  147.1
***
 57.02
***
  
 (4.77) (9.57)  
N 104 104  
rho 0.755 (C)  0  
F 6.236   
Prob > F 0.0147 (A)   
Wald chi2(1)  6.840  
Prob > chi2  0.0089 0.0029 (D) 
chi2(1)   8.86 
Table 1: Analysis Results, t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
                                                          
32 Fixed-effects will not work well with data for which within-cluster variation is minimal or for slow changing variables 
over time. 
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Observations:  
 
 (A) The F-test given by Prob > F in table above shows whether all the coefficients in t
he model are different than zero. The resulting value of the variable should be < 0.05 i
n order for the model to be termed as suitable. Thus, as Prob > F = 0.0147 < 0.05 the a
pplication of a Fixed effect model in this case is accurate and appropriate.  
 (B) The coefficients for the fixed effect model imply that the absorption rate decrease
s when GDP changes. However, in Random effect model-Interpretation of the coeffici
ents is not explicit and is quite tricky, since they include both the within-entity and bet
ween-entity effects.33 ( Torres-Reyna, 2011) 
 
 T-statistics tests the hypothesis that each coefficient is different from null. To reject th
is, the t-value has to be higher than 1.96 (for a 95% confidence). “It is a joint test to se
e if the dummies for all years are equal to 0, if they are then no time fixed effects are 
needed.”( Torres-Reyna, 2011) Hence, our t-test shows that GDP per capita has a sign
ificant influence on absorption rate. That is the higher the t-value the higher the releva
nce of the variable under considerations. 
 (C) The interclass correlation captures the variance due to differences within the panel
s. In this case it equals 75.5%, meaning that 75,5% of the variance is due to difference
s within the panels. 
 (D) Prob>chi2 is < 0.05 (i.e. significant) then we can apply the fixed effects model as 
it will be more efficient than the Hausman model. The result of Prob>chi2=0.0029< 0.
05 definitely confirms the suitability of the Fixed effect model for a study with the use
                                                          
33 I will not concentrate on the Random effect model since it is not the core of this analysis 
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d data set. 
 (F) The Random effect model delivers a positive coefficient, which implies that the ex
planatory variable (GDP) dominates its variation over time and the fixed effect elimin
ates the GDP cross countries effect. 
Based on the observations from the conducted tests it is clear I can be confident in 
using the fixed effect model for analyzing the interdependency between GDP per capita and 
the EU fund absorption rate thru countries and thru time. Additionally the tests proved a 
strong determinative relationship between GDP per capita of a country and it’s absorption 
rate. The negative correlation reflects that an increase of GDP per capita by one unit may 
decrease the absorption capacity by 0,03%. In other words a higher GDP declines the ability 
to receive financial support from EU structural funds.  
There are several options how to explain the output of the analysis.  
First the negative relationship between the two variables may be caused by the fact 
that the EU fund payments are not equally distributed during the years.  Each planning 
period34 has a very high application rate and low payment rate. Then after a vast number of 
applications have been approved a higher payment rate will follow. Finally at the end of each 
period which is the last 1,5 years the payment rate may decline for the reason of exhaustion 
or block35 of resources. Coupled with the highly complicated process of subsidy approval the 
misbalance between the allocated resources and their concentration during the years creates a 
barrier to monitor the relationship between economic performance and fund payment rate.  
In brief the reason, why the absorption rate is difficult to be positioned in a 
                                                          
34 now 6 years e.g. 2007-2013 
35 Payments are blocked due to monitoring problems, lack of transparency or other reasons which limit the execution of 
projects, which was the case of Bulgaria in 2008. 
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relationship with GDP, is the fact that in contrast to the relatively constant development of 
GDP through time, the absorption rate has a cyclical development path. Here it should be 
mentioned that GDP also has a certain cyclical development path, nevertheless the absorption 
rate changes every 6 years due administrative interventions. GDP on the other hand is not 
influenced by any artificially set planning periods. 
Then specialists such as Horvath claim that the Absorption is mainly determined by 
the administrative capacity. No one until now has studied the financial capacity (budgetary 
capacity to co-finance projects) and its relevancy towards the EU fund payment rate. Yet, I 
believe, that the conducted study extended to other factors such as the mentioned 
transparency level in each country and modified with a weighted time variable, will result in 
findings important for the development of the EU policy.  
With the current study I confirmed Horwath’s claim that it will be problematic to 
study the relationship between financial capacity and payment rate and that a good study will 
be possible at least after the planning period of 2007-2013 elapsed. Additionally constructive 
analysis will be possible if fund payment rates for the current and following period of 2014-
2020 are available. These will provide data for a study, which will be able to create a 
generalizing theory, based on empirical tests.  
The future study should involve final data of economic performance through the 
years which will include also data about the current financial crisis and its influence on the 
implementation of the European Structural funds. After all, it will be also possible to take 
systematic consideration of the cyclical development of both factors GDP per capita and EU 
structural fund absorption rate.  
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In order to understand why exactly I study the relationship between implementation 
of the Structural funds and economic performance, it is important to restate the role of the 
structural funds. These are a subsidy which is injected into the economy. 
Using the Keynessian approach we can also see interdependence between GDP and 
the absorption capacity. Should we follow the principle of the Keynessian multiplicator an 
∆Y=1/∆G, so according to Y= C+I+G+T+NX the injection of subventions by the government 
through the EU funding has to have positive effects on the national income and therefore 
raise the tax level, which on the other hand is used for further investment into the economy. 
The theory states a clear interdependence between GDP and the public interventions. 
Nevertheless it does not consider factors which are difficult to quantify such as corruption, 
which is the main barrier for receiving financial support from the EU. When the funding is 
limited by the low absorption rate, as a consequence of such negative factors, the level of G is 
much lower and a significant part of GDP is not being generated in the next period.  
Again this new very important opportunity for further analysis arises. Since the 
corruption level in countries is measured by several global organizations e.g. transparency 
International, it might be suitable to integrate it as another variable in the quantity analysis. 
The implication for policy maker will be that before investing in any kind of development, or 
at least parallel with these investments, corruption and activities which create inefficiency 
should be limited. A very good proof is the fact that the European countries with lower 
corruption level such as Denmark, Germany, Sweden, which also receive resources from the 
SF report significantly higher absorption rate. The conclusion of that might be that corruption 
level including inefficiency creating activities as well as the national income are the most 
important factors, taken from the financial capacity point of view, which influence the ability 
of a country to absorb EU money.  
The last way how to explain the analysis results is to consider the option that in 
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times of cyclical changes in the economy the EU funds may be used as stimulus for the 
economy and that the investments shift from the private to the public sector. In particular the 
negative coefficient may imply that the absorption capacity of the countries with lower GDP 
increases when GDP declines especially in years of crisis or recession as we can see. The fact, 
that still multiple governments in the EU have other than liberal policies, favors this 
hypothesis. As a good example the still ongoing crisis which started n 2008 can be used to 
illustrate this. Many governments used the EU funds as an option to stimulate the economy 
during this period. Among others Bulgaria, Romania and Poland as well, still, concentrate on 
infrastructural projects, which on one hand are legitimate for EU funding and on the other 
hand create jobs and a strong business network structure. Therefore a declining GDP can 
positively influence the EU fund spending and expand the absorption capacity. 
Finally it is necessary to comment the methodological aspect of the findings. The 
results of the analysis imply that the data set is not long enough, meaning that the variation of 
the explanatory variable exceeds its variation over time. GDP is available for 25 countries 
within 4 years only. As a result the random effect model produces a positive coefficient and 
the effect of GDP cross countries is eliminated when taking the fixed effects in account. 
Therefore in order to conduct this study with larger explanatory power more data for the 
absorption rate are needed, optimally for each year for a period of time of at least 15 years.  
With this in mind the lesson for the EU fund authority will be that a simple provision 
of financial support will not have the result of lowering differences between countries as long 
as other factors create a barrier for them to fully utilize them.  
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Summary 
The aim of this study is to explore the existence and range of determinative 
relationship between the EU Fund absorption rate and the economic performance of the 
European Union countries. In fact I examine the way how GDP per capita of 25 EU members 
influences their real ability to inject financial resources from the EU Structural funds to their 
local economies financial resources.  
I am using a fixed effects model for the analysis of the effects between the variables 
across time. Data from two planning periods 1999-2006 and 2007-2013 are used, where each 
period is represented by statistics for two years. Therefore the influence of GDP per capita 
(independent variable) on the fund payment rate in 2004,2007,2008 and 2011 has been tested.  
As a result of the panel data analysis a very important finding occurs. Namely it 
turns out that GDP per capita significantly influences the real amount of money a country has 
in fact injected into the economy. The economic performance of a country defines its ability 
to co-finance projects, which will be also funded by the EU Structural funds. In this case the 
higher GDP the higher is the national budget, through which infrastructure of all kinds are 
financed (e.g. highways, water cleaning stations, power plants). Likewise low income limits 
the ability to invest in public infrastructure, which on the other hand limits development.  
In addition the study confirmed the claim of several authors like Becker (2007) and 
Georgescu (2008), who emphasize on the importance of administrative capacity. I also 
discovered that the absorption capacity of a country is strongly determined by factors such as 
processes, operations and monitoring of the EU fund transactions, especially after a project 
has been approved.  Therefore the financial capacity combined with the administrative 
capacity of a country determines its overall ability to utilize supranational aid.  
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Additionally I would like to point out that this study has a great potential to reveal 
key findings, which will lead to important directions for the EU Funding optimizing. As a 
result the goals of decreasing regional differences in wealth between countries can be reached 
with higher efficacy and efficiency. Nevertheless this optimistic belief can be proofed after 
additional analyses and studies, which combine both a theoretical and highly empirical 
approach. 
For instance, I recommend an extension and modification of the study by addition of 
variables which will examine the influence of transparency and corruption on the EU fund 
payment rate. If a strong relationship between GDP, payment rate and corruption occurs then 
the significant hint for the EU policy makers will arise. In deed EU policies will have to be 
redesigned with major focus different than the local economy stimulation. The EU will have 
to focus on efficiency lost prevention instead. In other words money will have to be allocated 
in a way which will limit corruption on one side and rise transparency on the other side. 
Consequently such actions enable the potential of an economy to fully use and implement EU 
money so that it creates wealth, which is the biggest goal of the regional policy.  
With attention to the findings I of this paper recommend to the EU to extend the 
field of study in order understand better how the funding works, what is its influence in the 
economy and how the economy determines the absorption capacity of each member. 
Logically a better understanding will lead to a opportunity to optimize the implementation 
and measurement processes and so reducing inefficiency and loss of resources. In the case of 
the EU Structural funds reducing inefficiency will mean real implementation of more than 50% 
of the EU budget, an amount that approximately equals to the annual GDP of Austria, 
Argentina, South Africa or the United Arab Emirates. 
  
36 
Glossary 
AR: Absorption Rapacity, EU Fund Payment Rate 
CF: Cohesion Fund 
EC: European Commission 
EP: European Parliament  
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund 
ESF: European Social Fund 
EU: European Union 
EU27: European Union with 27 Member Countries 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
NSRF: National Strategic Reference Framework 
NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
OP: Operational Programme  
SF: Structural Funds 
SME: Small and Middle sized Enterprises 
TOR: Traditional Own Resources 
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A. Appendix 1: Data set: GDP per Capita and EU Fund Absorption Rate for 
EU25 
Country /Year Absorption rate (%) GDP per capita (€) 
  2004 2007 2008 2011 2004 2007 2008 201136 
Latvia 40 73 96 36 4 800 9 200 10 100 8 588 
Lithuania 42 66 87 48 5 300 8 500 9 700 8 827 
Poland 43 55 87 37 5 300 8 200 9 500 9 518 
Hungary 43 63 80 35 8 100 9 900 10 500 9 564 
Estonia 41 87 95 42 7 200 12 000 12 200 11 404 
Slovak Republic 42 57 88 28 6 300 10 200 11 900 12 410 
Malta 40 75 94 27 11 300 13 300 14 100 14 267 
Czech Republic 42 70 87 26 9 000 12 800 14 800 14 684 
Portugal 101 73 81 38 14 200 16 000 16 200 15 760 
Slovenia 42 65 87 37 13 600 17 100 18 400 17 444 
Greece 57 70 87 35 16 700 19 900 20 700 18 674 
Spain 208 84 78 37 19 700 23 500 23 900 22 855 
Cyprus 28 60 82 37 17 000 20 300 21 600 23 978 
EU 25 84 74 87 37 22 900 26 200 26 200 25 383 
Italy 93 79 88 22 24 000 26 200 26 300 25 708 
United Kingdom 88 76 84 39 29 600 33 700 29 300 26 307 
France 93 82 89 35 26 500 29 600 30 100 29 937 
Germany 96 99 92 41 26 600 29 500 30 100 31 196 
Belgium 98 60 87 32 28 000 31 600 32 299 32 478 
Austria 99 75 95 39 28 700 33 000 33 900 34 423 
Finland 106 82 89 41 29 100 34 000 34 900 34 438 
Netherlands 72 81 86 34 30 200 34 900 36 200 35 501 
Ireland 185 79 91 48 37 000 43 500 40 500 36 073 
Sweden 117 87 92 47 32 400 36 900 36 100 37 836 
Denmark 101 74 84 38 36 500 41 700 42 800 41 300 
Luxembourg 181 69 83 41 60 000 78 100 80 800 76 195 
Table 1: Absorption Capacity and GDP per Capita in EU25 in 2004, 2007, 2008, 2011, Source: 
European Commission and Eurostat 
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